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Abstract
Hate speech detection or offensive language
detection are well-established but controver-
sial NLP tasks. There is no denying the tempta-
tion to use them for law enforcement or by pri-
vate actors to censor, delete, or punish online
statements. However, given the importance of
freedom of expression for the public discourse
in a democracy, determining statements that
would potentially be subject to these measures
requires a legal justification that outweighs
the right to free speech in the respective case.
The legal concept of ‘incitement to hatred’ an-
swers this question by preventing discrimina-
tion against and segregation of a target group,
thereby ensuring the members’ acceptance as
equal in a society - likewise a prerequisite for
democracy. In this paper, we pursue these
questions based on the criminal offense of ‘in-
citement to hatred’ in § 130 of the German
Criminal Code along with the underlying EU
Council Framework Decision. Under the Ger-
man Network Enforcement Act, social media
providers are subject to a direct obligation to
delete postings violating this offense. We take
this as a use case to study the transition from
the ill-defined concepts of hate speech or offen-
sive language which are usually used in NLP
to an operationalization of an actual legally
binding obligation. We first translate the le-
gal assessment into a series of binary deci-
sions and then collect, annotate, and analyze
a dataset according to our annotation scheme.
Finally, we translate each of the legal decisions
into an NLP task based on the annotated data.
In this way, we ultimately also explore the ex-
tent to which the underlying value-based deci-
sions could be carried over to NLP.
1 Introduction
The political discourse about the appropriate an-
swer to the increasing amount of hate speech on
social media has led to a corresponding increase
in the desire to regulate and even more to auto-
matically detect undesired postings.1 With ‘hate
speech’ not being a legal term, what are the actual
values that are at stake in this debate which are
protected by our legal systems? Looking beyond
the shallow question of which statements or means
of discussion are perceived as being ‘appropriate’
or ‘offensive’, the legal perspective allows for a
deeper understanding of the values underpinning
the discussion.
Given the importance of freedom of expression
for the public discourse in a democracy, determin-
ing statements that would potentially be subject
to deletion, requires a legal justification that out-
weighs the right to free speech in the respective
case. The value that claims to justify the interfer-
ence with freedom of expression is the protection
of public peace - which is at stake when a part of
the population is attacked to a degree that might
lead to segregation. Being accepted as a human
being and equal member of society is then again
a precondition for democracy, and so has the po-
tential to outweigh freedom of speech in extreme
cases.
Building on these considerations, we investigate
in this paper how the legal concept of incitement
to hatred could be operationalized as an NLP task.
We find that two subtasks (target group detection
and targeting act detection) are crucial from a legal
viewpoint. We develop an annotation scheme and
show that both task can be annotated by non legally
trained persons with sufficient reliability. We make
our dataset available to foster future research in this
important area.
1See, for instance, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online’ pub-
lished by the European Commission (COM(2017) 555 final).
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2 Related Work
Previous work has intensively investigated the au-
tomated detection of offensive Internet discourse
under a variety of names, for instance: abusive
language (Waseem et al., 2017), ad hominem ar-
guments (Habernal et al., 2018), aggression (Ku-
mar et al., 2018), cyberbullying (Xu et al., 2012;
Macbeth et al., 2013), hate speech (Warner and
Hirschberg, 2012; Ross et al., 2016; Del Vigna
et al., 2017), offensive language usage (Razavi
et al., 2010), profanity (Schmidt and Wiegand,
2017), threats (Oostdijk and van Halteren, 2013) or
socially unacceptable discourse (Fišer et al., 2017).
With few work on German (Ross et al., 2016), Ital-
ian (Del Vigna et al., 2017), Dutch (Oostdijk and
van Halteren, 2013), or Slovene (Fišer et al., 2017),
the majority of prior work remains directed at the
English language.
Previous interdisciplinary work between NLP
and the legal perspective is more rare and mostly
focused on predicting the outcome of court trials,
mainly from the U.S.2 Deriving data from court de-
cisions is an approach that particularly makes sense
from the perspective of the Anglo-American com-
mon law system.3 But the dependence on existing
court decisions makes it difficult to work with legal
problems where relevant case law is not available
as a data source. To address this problem, Zufall
et al. (2019) focused on the deductive method of the
continental law tradition based on statutory rules.
They translated the legal assessment of defama-
tory offenses in German criminal law into a series
of annotatable binary decisions. We build on this
work and investigate how the criminal offense of
‘incitement to hatred’ as a legal concept can be
operationalized as an NLP task.
3 Operationalizing Legal Assessment
As the legal evaluation depends on the applica-
ble legal regime, we focus on the legal concept
of ‘incitement to hatred’ as perceived by § 130
of the German Criminal Code (StGB)4. This sec-
tion of the law is of particular interest, as a social
media post violating this offense triggers a direct
2Katz et al. (2017), Bruninghaus and Ashley (2003),
Kastellec (2010); for non-U.S. examples, see: Waltl et al.
(2017), Aletras et al. (2016).
3Common law refers to the Anglo-American legal system
that derives the law from judicial decisions, in contrast to the
civil law of continental Europe that focuses on the abstraction
of legal concepts in codified statutory law (Garner, 2001).
4Strafgesetzbuch v. 13.11.1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322).
obligation for the platform provider to delete the
respective content based on the German Network
Enforcement Act.5
We operationalize the legal assessment, as
shown in Figure 1, by translating it into a sequence
of binary decisions (Figure 2), which can be used
for data annotation and defining the necessary NLP
tasks. Hereafter, we turn to an analysis of the legal
decision process and clarify how we derived the
decision tree.
Underlying values ‘Public peace’ being the
value that § 130 StGB seeks to protect, its require-
ments are interpreted in the light of its aim. By
preventing segregation, the intent is to protect mi-
norities from being deprived of their human dignity
as equal members in a democratic society. This in-
tention can run counter to freedom of expression as
protected by Art. 5(1) of the German Constitution
and is as interference only justified if in the partic-
ular case the legal interest in protecting the public
peace outweighs freedom of expression. However,
if the relevant expression violates human dignity
(Art. 1 GG), it is, according to German case law, al-
ready not protected by freedom of expression in the
first place.6 How to shape this crucial relationship
to freedom of expression is thus the key issue of
whether a statement is deemed to be a punishable
‘incitement to hatred’.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of § 130 are more specific,
as they punish acts of denial or approval of the
National Socialist rule. Thus, we limit the investi-
gation to the first two paragraphs of § 130 StGB.7
3.1 § 130(1) vs. § 130(2) StGB
§ 130(1) StGB The first paragraph of § 130 StGB
follows a relatively clear structure by distinguish-
ing between the target object of an attack as spe-
cific groups that can be distinguished by nation-
ality, race, religion or ethnic origin on one side
and between groups constituting ‘sections of the
population’ on the other. The first paragraph also
list several acts targeted at those groups which it
aims to punish: incite hatred, calling for violent
measures, etc.
5Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz v. 1.9.2017 (BGBl. I S.
3352). The Act imposes the obligation on these providers to
delete illegal content upon notification within seven days; in
case of evidently illegal content within 24 hours.
6BVerfG NJW 2008, 2907 (2909); 1995, 3303 (3304).
7We however, annotate our data set by flagging potential
relevant postings in order to obtain data for future research on
§ 130(3) and § 130(4) StGB; see 4.2.
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§ 130(1) StGB
object of attack
→ group
• defined/distinguishable by:
• nationality, race, religion or ethnic origin
• sections of the population
→ individual 
• because of their belonging to one of the 
aforementioned groups
§ 130(2) StGB
act
• inciting hatred
• calling for violent or arbitrary measures
• assaulting human dignity by:
• insulting
• maliciously maligning
• defaming
Incitement to hatred under German criminal law
potential to disturb the public peace (in Germany)
act means
no
. 1
• disseminating 
• making accessible to the public
• offering, supplying or making accessible to 
a person under 18  years
writtten 
materials
no
. 2
• making accessible
• to the public
• to a person under 18  years
broadcast 
or telemedia
no
. 3 • creating, receiving, storing, offering etc. written materials
object of attack
content materialising/embodying the conduct of para. 1,
addressing also objects outside Germany!
no
. 1
no
. 2
§ 130(1) takes precedence over § 130(2)
Figure 1: Legal assessment of incitement to hatred according to § 130 StGB.
§ 130(2) StGB As shown in Figure 1, paragraph
2 refers back to paragraph 1. Looking into the
statutory text, it stipulates:
Whosoever
1. with respect to written materials [..] which
incite hatred against an aforementioned group,
sections of the population or individuals because
of their belonging to one of the aforementioned
groups [..], which call for violent or arbitrary mea-
sures against them, or which assault their human
dignity by insulting, maliciously maligning or de-
faming them,
(a) disseminates such written materials [..]8
Through this phrasing, the law frames both object
(i.e. the target group) and relevant act (i.e. inciting
hatred etc.) of § 130(1) StGB as the overarching
content that then again becomes the new object of
paragraph 2. The punishable act that paragraph 2
addresses is then not just the expression of hatred
as in paragraph 1, but rather actions of disseminat-
ing or making accessible that overarching content
(containing the acts of incitement that § 130(1)
punishes) through means of written materials or
telemedia.
However, for our use case, the detection of social
media posts, there is no added value in implement-
ing these actions for the following reasons:
The act of disseminating or making accessible
to the public by (written materials) in § 130(2) no.
1 or by telemedia in no. 2 or the act of creating
written materials in no. 3. are requirements that
are always met in case of public social media post-
ing on the Internet. What remains to be assessed
8Translation based on Michael Bohlander,
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_stgb/.
for paragraph 2 is then only whether the framed
content (i.e. target object and act) of paragraph 1
is given. Accordingly, in case of public social me-
dia postings, we assume that if the requirements
with respect to the target group and the required ac-
tions of paragraph 1 are met, paragraph 2 is equally
fulfilled.
Potential to disturb the public peace For our
use case, the more relevant difference between the
two paragraphs is the following: unlike paragraph
2, paragraph 1 additionally requires that the punish-
able conduct must have the potential to disturb the
public peace, which is specifically a reference to
the public peace in Germany. It is being disturbed
if the target group is situated in Germany as op-
posed to target groups located outside the country,
e.g. foreigners not living in Germany.9
Thus, if the respective social media post has the
potential to disturb the public peace because it tar-
gets a group situated in Germany, the following
applies regarding the relationship between § 130(1)
and (2): based on conflict rules, paragraph 1 gener-
ally takes precedence over paragraph 2. § 130(2)
StGB becomes relevant when the target group is
not situated in Germany.10. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 ‘group situated in Germany’ is already a sub-
condition of ‘sections of the population’. For other
target groups, however, this needs to be tested fur-
ther. This is why we re-use the label ‘group situated
in Germany’ at the end of the decision tree as indi-
9MüKoStGB/Schäfer, § 130 Rn. 31.
10Hörnle NStZ 02, 113, 116; Lackner/Kühl, § 130 StGB
Rn. 13; Schönke/Schröder, § 130 StGB Rn. 27; BGH 46, 217.
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cated by the dotted line in Figure 2 to distinguish
between (§ 130(1) StGB) and (§ 130(2) StGB).
3.2 Target Group
Having clarified the differences between § 130(1)
and (2) StGB, we turn now to an analysis of the re-
quirements both paragraphs share: the target group
and the potential offender’s conduct or act targeting
of that group (see section 3.3). As shown in Fig-
ure 1, § 130(1) StGB refers to two potential target
groups: (i) a group distinguishable by nationality,
race, religion or ethnic origin, and (ii) sections of
the population. As both share the precondition that
they represent a ’group of persons’ we incorporate
this as our first label for annotation in the decision
tree (Figure 2).
Distinguishable group The first target group is
defined as a group of person that is distinguishable
either by (i) nationality, (ii) race, (iii) religion, or
(iv) ethnic origin. These groups were historically
considered particularly vulnerable to segregation.11
Example 1 shows groups that fit these conditions.
– French people are frog eaters. (nationality)
– Black people = slaves!! (race)
– Muslims are all terrorists! (religion)
– Sinti and Roma - awful parasites! (ethnic origin)
Example 1: Comments with distinguishable groups
based on nationality, race, religion, or ethnic origin.
Sections of the population The other target
group is referred to as sections of the population.
Case law defines this term as ‘all groups that can
be distinguished from the rest of the population as
long as they possess some significance in numbers
to the extent that the individuals are no more iden-
tifiable’.12 To operationalize this legal term, we
divide it into the following three requirements:
(i) The first point implies that the group must
be situated in Germany. This is equivalent to the
requirement of ’having the potential to disturb the
public peace’ (in Germany). We reuse this sub-
condition also as a label to distinguish between
§ 130(1) and (2) StGB as explained above in sec-
tion 3.1 and shown by the dotted line in Figure
2.
(ii) The second point requires that the group be
distinguishable as a section of the general public
based on any clear criteria (e.g. appearance or in-
ner qualities). The criteria here are not limited to
11MüKoStGB/Schäfer, § 130 Rn. 14, 15.
12BGH GA 79, 391; BGH NStZ 2015, 512 (513).
nationality, race, religion or ethnic origin. Example
2 shows groups that are too vague to be clearly
distinguishable from the general public:
– The left are all psychos!
– ’foreign sluts’/’foreign gangs’
Example 2: Not sections of the population.
Furthermore, two important groups of people are
not considered ‘sections of the population’: women
and Germans. As both are forming a majority, they
go beyond a mere ‘section’ of the population.13
In light of the underlying purpose of § 130 StGB,
preventing segregation, these groups do not fall
under the scope of protection.
(iii) The third point, then, requires the group to
possess significance in numbers, i.e. being large
enough that the individuals composing the group
can no longer be individually identified. This again
can be traced back to the purpose of protecting the
public peace - and not the right to honor of a few,
as in case of defamatory offenses. The requirement
is, e.g. not fulfilled in case of a temporary assembly
of soccer fans, for instance.
Example 3 illustrates groups that fit all three
sub-conditions:
– Refugees stink and are only in Germany to rape our women!
– The German judges are all corrupt!
Example 3: Sections of the populations.
Furthermore, workers, employers, black,
catholics, muslims, or the disabled are all
considered sections of the population.
Individuals Finally, the scope of the offense cov-
ers individuals in case they are targeted because
of their belonging to one of the aforementioned
groups or sections, as illustrated in Example 4.
– you fucking immigrant should leave!
Example 4: Targeting an individual as a group member.
3.3 Targeting Act
With respect to the target group, the commission
of incitement to hatred then requires at least one
of the following acts listed in § 130(1) StGB to be
committed by the potential offender: (i) inciting
hatred, (ii) calling for violent or arbitrary measures,
13Compare Steinl (2018) for a critical discussion.
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group of 
persons?
noindividual as 
member of a group?
group situated in Germany?
all no
punishable: Art. 1(1) 
Framework Decision
§ 130 StGB (German Criminal Code)EU Framework Decision 
group large enough 
by numbers?
not punishable
AND
punishable
□ incite hatred
□ incite violence
any yes
any yes
OR
yes
yes
any yes
OR
no
§ 130(1) StGB
yes
no
distinguishable from 
the general public?
AND
with respect to that group, does the post:
□ incite hatred
□ call for violence
□ call for arbitrary 
measures
□ assault human dignity by:
□ insulting
□ maliciously maligning
□ defaming
group distinguishable by:
□ nationality
□ race
□ religion
□ ethnic origin
group defined by:
□ nationality
□ race
□ religion
□ ethnic origin
□ color
□ descent
§ 130(2) StGB
Figure 2: Decision tree as the basis for data annotation.
and (iii) assaulting human dignity by insulting, ma-
liciously maligning, or defaming.
Inciting hatred This has been defined as ‘con-
duct influencing emotions and intellect of others,
objectively capable and subjectively intended to
create or intensify an emotionally enhanced, hos-
tile attitude (towards the respective group).’14 To
outweigh freedom of expression the conduct has to
go beyond mere rejection or contempt. Example 5
illustrates comments that fit these criteria.
– Refugees are deceitful parasites enjoying live thanks to hard
working german citizens!!
– To all foreigners: it is a pity that Dachau is no longer heated!
Example 5: Comments inciting hatred.
Calling for violent or arbitrarymeasures Call-
ing means more than merely endorsing. It refers
to influencing others in order to give rise to their
determination to commit violent or arbitrary mea-
sures.15 Violent measures do not just comprise
assault, but also violent expulsion or pogroms. Ar-
bitrary measures might be triggering discrimina-
tion by, for example, not giving the group access
to public positions or excluding them from partici-
pating in economic activities. Under this definition,
the mere statement ‘Refugees out!’ is not per se
intended to influence others to arbitrary measures,
but rather covered by freedom of expression. Ex-
ample 6 illustrates comments calling for violent or
arbitrary measures.
14BGHSt 21, 371 (372); BGHSt 46, 212 (217).
15BGH 3.4.2008 – 3 StR 394/07.
– Refugees should be hunt down and deported!
– Burn all Moslems in their mosques!
– No access for gays to hospitals, let them suffer!
Example 6: Calling for violent or arbitrary measures.
Assaulting human dignity by insulting, ma-
liciously maligning or defaming Furthermore
§ 130(1) no. 2 StGB refers to assaulting human
dignity by insulting, maliciously maligning or de-
faming. Restricting freedom of expression is only
justified if the respective post reaches a level that
can be qualified as infringing on human dignity.
Insulting is - as to form or content - an especially
harmful expression of disrespect (based on the un-
derstanding of an average person).16 Maliciously
degrading comprises any judgmental utterance that
implies someone as not being worthy of the citi-
zens’ respect.17 Defaming, finally, means dissem-
inating an untrue fact suitable to disparage the re-
spective group as to their value and reputation.18
– Nigger with their greedy black hands, this disgusting sav-
agery and primitiveness in the expression of these underde-
veloped creatures. (insulting, maliciously degrading)
– Refugees bring in dangerous diseases that are carrying off
the German people! (defaming)
Example 7: Comments assaulting human dignity.
16BGHSt 7, 110; BGHSt 46, 212 (216).
17BGHSt 3, 346 (348).
18BGH 3.4.2008 - 3 StR 394/07.
5
3.4 EU Law
Germany being an EU Member State, the rele-
vant legal framework is not limited to the national
sphere, but comprises legal sources at EU level
as well. The EU Council Framework Decision
2008/913/JHA19 imposes in Article 1(1) on EU
Member States the obligation to ensure that the
following intentional conduct is punishable in their
jurisdiction:
(a) publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed
against a group of persons or a member of such
a group defined by reference to race, colour, reli-
gion, descent or national or ethnic origin;
(b) the commission of an act referred to in point
(a) by public dissemination or distribution of
tracts, pictures or other material;
The framework decision thus leads to a minimum
standard for punishable statements in all EU Mem-
ber States - even though each state may (like Ger-
many) go beyond that requirement. As the punish-
able conduct in Article 1(1) overlaps partly with
§ 130 StGB, it can be operationalized by flagging
the respective conditions as Figure 2 illustrates.
This enables us to identify statements which are
punishable in all EU Member States.20
4 Dataset
Based on the above operationalization of the le-
gal assessment, we can now manually annotate the
legal decisions on a large number of online com-
ments. As relatively few court decisions based on
§ 130 StGB are available, our contribution also lies
in showcasing how the perspective of continental
law combined with annotation is an alternative to
obtain data for classifier training. We are going to
make the annotated dataset publicly available and
are attaching it as a supplement to this submission.
4.1 Data Sources
As this work is, to our knowledge, the first attempt
to investigate German social media posts for in-
citement to hatred, we created a custom dataset
to match our needs. Base data was sampled and
requested from a multitude of sources with the
primary goal of obtaining sufficient examples of
incitement to hatred. Table 1 provides an overview
of the final composition of the base data.
19Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28
November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions
of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law.
20It does not, however, necessarily imply that a direct obli-
gation of social media providers to delete postings is triggered
- as in case of the German Network Enforcement Act.
Source # Category
Web search 80 Incitement candidates
Made-up 157 Incitement candidates
Anti hate speech initiatives 88 Incitement candidates
GermEval2019 425 Abuse, insult, profanity
GermEval2019 250 Other
Table 1: Composition of the base data by source.
Web search A manual search scanning Twitter,
comment sections of online newsrooms, law fo-
rums, court databases as well as news articles
on the topic of incitement yielded 80 short texts,
largely candidates of incitement to hatred.
Made-up In order to obtain more examples of
‘Incitement to Hatred’, we asked volunteers to
anonymously write short texts containing the of-
fense.
Anti hate speech initiatives We include in our
dataset 88 comments collected by the initia-
tive ‘respect!’ of Demokratiezentrum Baden-
Würtemberg.21
GermEval2019 Finally, data samples were taken
from the corpus of subtask two of GermEval 2019,
a shared task on the identification of offensive lan-
guage (Struß et al., 2019). The data, entirely com-
posed of tweets from Twitter, is labeled into the
categories other and offensive, with subcategoires
profanity, insult, and abuse. In order to include
some more Tweets that focus on the same overall
topics, but without being hateful, we add 250 com-
ments (25% of the final dataset) from the ‘Other’
category in the GermEval2019 data.
4.2 Annotation
As we have already operationalized § 130 StGB
in terms of binary decisions (see Figure 2 and sec-
tion 3), we can utilize this as an annotation scheme.
The full dataset was annotated by two people with-
out legal training. This serves as a way to inves-
tigate the extent to which our operationalization
can be generalized well and be understood with-
out a legal background. However, we did provide
annotators with an annotation manual with further
explanations, instructions, and examples.22 Anno-
tators were instructed to only annotate 50 texts a
day to mitigate the effect of fatigue. A reference
21https://demokratiezentrum-bw.de/
respect-meldestelle-hetze-im-internet/
22We make this document available as a supplement to this
submission. It is however written in German.
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Group Layperson 1 Layperson 2
Foreigners / Migrants 159 112
Other 103 137
Left wing/Green Party 95 47
Muslims 84 62
Other politicians 77 35
Nationality / Origin 48 57
Jews 47 40
Women 29 26
‘not sure’ 27 36
LGBTQ+ 17 23
Black 15 14
Disabled/sick 6 5
Right wing 0 2
Table 2: Distribution for all groups.
annotation of 101 posts was provided by a fully-
qualified lawyer of German law applying the same
annotation scheme.
To facilitate the NLP task, the following annota-
tion questions were additionally added:
Group explicitly mentioned? This is a ‘yes/no’
decision, where ‘explicitly’ means that there is an
identifying surface string for the group.
– Euthanasia is the only way to deal with all the disabled peo-
ple, they should be buried.
– You should gas all the Jews. All they want is your money.
– The oil eyes should set themselves on fire with their gasoline.
Example 8: Explicitly mentioned groups.
This excludes pronouns and implicit mentions,
such as I’ve got the Final Solution: set refugee
shelters on fire! which targets refugees.
Surface form of the group If a group is explic-
itly mentioned, we annotate the surface form in the
comment. This is highlighted in bold in Example 8.
Group category To generalize better over the
many surface variants that can reference to the
same group, we created a short list of frequently
attacked groups and asked annotators to choose one
of these or ‘other’. For example, ‘Muslim(s)’ could
also be referred to as ‘Mussie(s)’ or ‘Osama(s)’.
We deliberately include here also groups not cov-
ered by the law like women (see section 3.2), as
we also need negative examples for training and
evaluation of the derived NLP tasks.
4.3 Data Analysis
Based on the annotation, 61.7% of the posts men-
tioned a group, and 15.4% of these posts (a group
is mentioned) are targeted to individuals. 90.6% of
the groups are explicitly mentioned, indicating that
publishers tend to clarify their targets in such posts.
Table 2 gives an overview of the distribution of the
attacked groups.
Regarding the specific target groups that the law
requires to be distinguishable by nationality, reli-
gion, race or ethnic origin, we make some changes
to increase the specificity and accuracy of the
groups. For example, we use ‘muslims’ and ‘jews’
to stand in for religion, we use ‘black’ to repre-
sent race, and we use ‘foreigners/migrants’ as an
example for sections of the population. This can
also help us to understand the popularity of target
groups, as shown in Table 2. If we consider ‘left
wing/green’ also as a political target, then politi-
cal group is the most targeted group, followed by
foreigners/migrants and religion. This indicates
that politically related problems are an important
issue in Germany. Groups like ‘disabled’, ‘black’
and ‘LGBTQ+’ appear fewer than 20 times in all
1000 posts. Groups classified as ’others’ by the
annotators were mainly sports clubs. We also find
that stereotypes were often used for group names,
e.g. ‘rapefugee’ instead of ‘refugee’. We also dis-
cover some disagreements between the annotators,
e.g. annotator 2 only marked half of the number of
posts as politically related.
We analyze the inter-annotator reliability be-
tween laypersons as well as between laypersons
and the expert annotator in terms of Cohen’s Kappa
as shown in Table 3. Given the difficulty of the
task, the results are encouraging. Even though the
kappa value of individual decisions appears low,
especially relating to the targeting act, the overall
aggregated decision as to whether the post would
be punishable and under which paragraph of § 130
StGB is remarkably reliable. We conclude that peo-
ple without legal background can be sufficiently
enabled to annotate a dataset by framing the task
into a series of binary decisions and providing spe-
cific guidelines by a legal expert.
5 Operationalizing as NLP tasks
We already have the decision tree, but it remains
unclear how exactly the necessary steps can be
rendered as NLP tasks. Thus, we introduce two
new tasks: target group detection and targeting
attack detection.
Target Group Detection While groups are a
standard category in Named Entity Recognition,
we cannot use the usual models as the encoded
definition of group is rather different from what
we need here. For example, ‘refugee’ is a group
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Table 3: Inter-annotator reliability on a random-drawn subset of 100 comments
in our definition, but not a named entity. What
complicates the problem is that groups might be
referenced in a variety of different surface forms,
some of which are only metaphorically related to
the group (e.g. guests for refugees. Even with a
larger dataset, it is unrealistic to expect to learn all
variants from annotated data. A possible method to
find these variants might be to compare the closest
synonyms for a group as computed over a general
corpus with those computed over a domain specific
corpus.
The scope of § 130 StGB also covers individuals
who are targeted because they belong to a group.
For example, you fucking immigrant should leave!
would be covered. However, annotators only identi-
fied 3 instances of that phenomenon in our dataset.
Still, a strong detection baseline would be to just
use the singular of most groups, e.g. immigrant,
refugee, or guest.
Finally, we need to decide whether a group is
situated in Germany or not. Once we have estab-
lished which group is targeted, this could be solved
by a knowledge base lookup.
Targeting Attack Detection At this stage we ex-
amine with respect to the target group, whether
the post contains an attack that satisfies one of
the following descriptions: (i) inciting hatred, (ii)
calling for violence or arbitrary measures, or (iii)
assaulting human dignity by insulting, maliciously
maligning or defaming.
Given the low kappa values for the individual
target attacks (see Table 3), it seems unrealistic to
expect a system to learn any of these in a supervised
fashion. For a specific targeting act like calling
for violence it might be best to directly detect the
most common actions like ‘kill GROUP’ or ‘burn
GROUP’, as our dataset indicates that calls to some
actions are quite common. This would also limit
the number of false positives, e.g. when someone
‘threatens’ to burn a candle instead.
Alternatively, as the kappa for the decision as to
whether there was a targeting act at all (irrespective
of which one) was rather high, it might be worth-
while to use generic hate speech detection systems.
However, this would come at the price of model
transparency.
In general, there is a high level of metaphor,
irony and sarcasm in the comments, that will pose
serious challenges to all NLP methods. Even
though irony and sarcasm are not legal terms per
se, they might have an influence on the assessment
as to whether a targeting act like inciting hatred is
given. Accordingly, these cases can be captured
at the annotation level as “in dubio pro reo”, i.e.
to not label a targeting act as problematic if it was
clearly ironic.
Final decision layer Going back to our decision
tree in Figure 2, the final decision of whether the
social media post is punishable could directly be
derived from the above NLP tasks: the post is pun-
ishable if it is directed at a target group and if it
contains a targeting attack. The final step in deter-
mining whether paragraph 1 or 2 of § 130 StGB
applies is the task of deciding whether the group is
situated in Germany.
6 Conclusion
We investigated how the legal concept of ‘incite-
ment to hatred’ can be operationalized as an NLP
task. As a use case, we analyzed the respective stip-
ulation in the German Criminal Code. In doing so,
we also discussed the underlying conflict between
freedom of expression and the public peace as a pre-
condition to ensure equal participation. We derived
8
from this consideration a decision tree suited for
data annotation along with instructions for layper-
son annotation. Comparing layperson annotation to
the legal expert’s reference annotation showed that
laypersons can indeed be instructed to perform the
task sufficiently well. Finally, we analyzed how the
labels taken from the decision tree along with their
annotation can be operationalized as NLP tasks. In
future work, we will build on these findings to tech-
nically implement the legal concept of ‘incitement
to hatred’ as an automated classification task. To
do it justice, any implementation would, however,
have to be measured by the crucial balance between
freedom of expression and the prevention of segre-
gation as two important aspects of democracy.
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